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Abstract
It has been suggested that consciousness plays an important role in quantum mechanics as it is necessary for the
collapse of wave function during the measurement. Furthermore, this idea has spawned a symmetrical proposal: a
possibility that quantum mechanics explains the emergence of consciousness in the brain. Here we formulated several
predictions that follow from this hypothetical relationship and that can be empirically tested. Some of the experimental
results that are already available suggest falsification of the first hypothesis. Thus, the suggested link between human
consciousness and collapse of wave function does not seem viable. We discuss the constraints implied by the existing
evidence on the role that the human observer may play for quantum mechanics and the role that quantum mechanics
may play in the observer’s consciousness.
1. Introduction
The nature of human consciousness and its relation
to the physical reality is arguably the most puzzling
issue regarding the fundamental questions about our-
selves and the interaction with the world that we live
in. An interesting proposal has been put forward of a
link between the seemingly distant quantum mechan-
ics and consciousness, leading to a direct, yet bizarre
bridge between the mental and the physical. It all started
with the measurement problem in quantum mechanics,
which can be formulated as follows: According to quan-
tum mechanics, the states of any physical system can
be described fully by a wave function (state vector) that
characterizes various system’s variables such as its posi-
tion, momentum, energy or spin. Schro¨dinger’s famous
equation describes how these variables evolve over time
(Schro¨dinger, 1926). According to most interpretations
for the formalism of quantum mechanics (with the ex-
ception of the hidden variable theory, e.g., Bohm, 1952),
the system described by the wave function does not
have specific values (e.g., does not have a specific po-
sition), but is in a superposition state defined as the
weighted sum of all states that the system may possibly
assume following a measurement (known also as a set of
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eigenstates). This superposition can be verified experi-
mentally, for example through interference phenomena
(Zeilinger, 1999a). However, for each single measure-
ment, that is, whenever a macroscopic measuring device
is used to detect the state of a particular system, the re-
sult always indicates a single eigenstate, e.g., a single
photon always has a specific location in space. Impor-
tantly, the probabilities for observing the specific states,
i.e. their distributions, are predicted most accurately by
the wave functions, which describe the system as a su-
perposition of multiple states prior to the measurement.
This led physicists to conclude that a quantum system
can evolve in two, very different, forms: one is contin-
uous, deterministic and reversible, described by a wave
function and occurs prior to the measurement. The other
form is discontinuous but stochastic, as, during the mea-
surement, the system “jumps” suddenly from a super-
position state into a single randomly chosen eigenstate.
According to some interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics, this jump is an irreversible event that occurs dur-
ing the measurement process, and is usually referred to
as the collapse of wave function or reduction of state
vector. The measurement problem in quantum mechan-
ics refers to understanding the nature of this “collapse”,
both at the explanatory level, such as: “Which other,
more fundamental processes cause the collapse?”, and
the ontological level, such as: “Is the collapse physi-
cally real or it is just an artifact of the theoretical sys-
tem?”. This measurement problem is a major topic of
discussion in quantum physics and has been a source
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of disagreements among theoretical physicists for many
years as there is a number of different ways in which
one can interpret this set of theoretically very unsettling
but empirically indisputable properties of quantum me-
chanics.
Von Neumann (1932) was probably the first person
that addressed the problem of quantum measurement
systematically and gave hints of its possible relation to
human consciousness (for related reviews, see Primas
and Esfeld, 1997; Esfeld, 1999; Thaheld, 2005; Rosen-
blum and Kuttner, 2008). According to him, the mea-
surement process consists of three main components:
the system to be observed (S ), the measuring instru-
ments (M) and the observer (O). In order to measure
the state of S , a physical device is needed. Let us de-
note it as M1. This device has also its own states (e.g.,
the positions of the hand of a gauge) but these are sen-
sitive to, and interact with S . The problem becomes
more interesting when one realizes that, as S and M1
interact they form a combined system (S ′), which also
needs to be observed. This observation can be made
only by another measuring device (M2), but then again
S ′ in combination with M2 forms S ′′, which needs yet
another measuring device M3, and the chain can go on
up to the infinity. According to von Neumann, any mea-
suring instrument, M, although a macroscopic object,
should obey the fundamental rules of quantum mechan-
ics, much like S . Thus, before the state of a device M
has been measured, the device must be in a superposi-
tion state, and this holds for every device in the chain,
e.g., M1, M2, etc. This property postpones iteratively
the collapse of the wave function to an ever later mea-
suring device positioned higher and higher on the hi-
erarchy, rendering thus the problem unsolvable. Von
Neumann reasoned that in order to break this infinite
chain of measurements and to give to the whole process
a superposition-free, definite end, something with a very
distinct property––that cannot be described by the above
procedure and hence, by the quantum mechanics––needs
to be involved. He also provided a formal proof that the
formalism of quantum mechanics does not restrict the
choice of the point at which such a “cut” could be in-
serted and suggested, although only implicitly, that the
“subjective perception” of the human observer, O, or its
“abstract ego” plays this important chain-braking role
(von Neumann, 1932). Shortly after, London and Bauer
(1939) suggested explicitly that the collapse of the wave
function and thus, the measurement of a quantum pro-
cess, cannot occur without the registration of the results
in the observer’s consciousness. This new role of hu-
man consciousness in theoretical physics was defended
by pointing out that consciousness has a “completely
special character”, which is “the faculty of introspec-
tion”, and which in turn allows a person to be aware
of the status of its own awareness (London and Bauer,
1939), corresponding to the measurement of itself and
abrogating thus the need for any additional measure-
ment devices. Therefore, the registration of a result in
consciousness brings ultimately the initial system of the
measurement into a new form––taking a single eigen-
state. Later, Wigner popularized this link between con-
sciousness and collapse of wave function passionately
(Esfeld, 1999). Wigner suggested that “It is the en-
tering of an impression into our consciousness which
alters the wave function.” and “It is at this point that
consciousness enters the theory unavoidably and unal-
terably.”(cited from Shimony, 1963). Importantly, how-
ever, Wigner dropped this opinion completely at his fi-
nal years (Esfeld, 1999).
Critical evaluation and heated debate on this hypoth-
esis has not been absent (e.g., Putnam, 1961; Mar-
genau and Wigner, 1962; Shimony, 1963; Putnam,
1964; Cramer, 1986; Chalmers, 1997; Primas and Es-
feld, 1997; Mandel, 1999; Esfeld, 1999; Menskii, 2000;
Brukner and Zeilinger, 2002; French, 2002; Thaheld,
2005; Koch and Hepp, 2006; Penrose, 2007; Nauenberg,
2007; Stapp, 2007; Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2008).
Many of them address this issue from the philosophical
point of view. Although they went to deep and inter-
esting levels and brought up exciting ideas about fun-
damental aspects of the relationship between the mind
and the physical world, those profound analyses failed
to reach a simple and clear conclusion that would be
widely accepted. Partly due to this reason, the hypoth-
esis that consciousness causes (or is necessary for) the
collapse of the wave function and, therefore, plays an
important role in quantum mechanics remained a theo-
retical possibility for the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. Although not preferred by most physicists, this
solution to measurement problem is still strongly sug-
gested even in some recent theoretical works (e.g., Men-
skii, 2000; Stapp, 2007; Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2008).
In the present paper, we do not aim to provide an-
other philosophical argument. Instead, we attempt to
address this issue from an empirical perspective. We re-
formulate von Neumann’s hypothesis as an empirically
testable problem. We then attempt to falsify the hypoth-
esis on the basis of the existing empirical evidence, as
already suggested elsewhere (Mandel, 1999; Zeilinger,
1999a; Brukner and Zeilinger, 2002). In addition, we
identify the experiments that need to be made in order
to rule out alternative explanations and thus, to test the
hypothesis more thoroughly. This analysis is also in-
formative for the study of consciousness itself, a phe-
2
nomenon that is by no means easier to understand than
the measurement problem (Chalmers, 1997). Follow-
ing the hypothetical role of consciousness in the col-
lapse of wave function, a “symmetrical” proposal has
been made, namely, that the collapse of wave function
explains the emergence of consciousness. The most
straightforward approach is to equate the conscious-
ness with the collapse of the wave function. There-
fore, through a bidirectional relationship, the two deep
mysteries explain each other. This view has been ex-
plicitly expressed by e.g., Mensky (2007) but it is ar-
guably an implicit assumption made by many other au-
thors suggesting consciousness as a solution to the mea-
surement problem (e.g. von Neumann, 1932; Wigner,
as cited above; London and Bauer, 1939; Lockwood,
1996). Therefore, if the role of consciousness in the
collapse of wave function can be falsified by empirical
evidence, these suggestions of using quantum mechan-
ics to explain consciousness will also become if not un-
warranted, then considerably less attractive.
2. Experimental design
First, let us formulate the hypothesis to be tested:
Proposition: The event of forming an explicit phe-
nomenal representation of a result of quantum measure-
ment in an individual observer’s mind is necessary for
the wave function (superposition state) of the system to
collapse into a single eigenstate.
By using logic symbols of implication (⇒) we can
write this statement formally as:
CWF ⇒ PR, (1)
where CWF stands for “collapse of wave function” and
PR for “phenomenal representation”, meaning that the
collapse of wave function should be always associated
with a corresponding event of registering the results of
measurement in consciousness. Or, by using logical
negation (¬) we can express this proposition equiva-
lently as contraposition of (1):
¬PR⇒ ¬CWF, (2)
meaning that the collapse of wave function should never
occur if the corresponding result of measurement has
not been registered by a conscious observer.
There are multiple definitions of consciousness. Here
we adopt a definition that can be operationalized. There-
fore, the registration of a stimulus in the observers con-
sciousness means that the stimulus (i.e., the results of
Figure 1: The proposed experimental setup that can be used to test
whether collapse of wave function and consciousness about the out-
come of the measurement are dissociated. This double-slit experiment
is a modification of an actual experiment that has been carried out
(Kim et al., 2000) and is similar in principle to the setup proposed by
Scully and Dru¨hl (1982). See main text for the detail.
measurement) is perceived at the level of subjective ex-
perience and that the observer is aware of its presence
such that he/she can produce an appropriate verbal re-
port stating its identity. For example, one may state:
“The light beam hit the screen on the left side.”, “The
oscilloscope showed 1 MHz signal.” or “The gauge
pointed to 5 mV.” We think that this definition is fun-
damentally consistent with the issues described in the
introduction and is sufficient for the current analysis.
It is clear that this proposition can be never proven
true, much like any other theoretical statement in sci-
ence cannot ever be proven true (Popper, 1963). How-
ever, propositions can be proven untrue, and in the
present case this can be made simply by finding a
counter example, that is, by finding an experimental
setup in which the collapse of wave function is dissoci-
ated from consciousness about the outcome of the mea-
surement. Thus, the first goal is to find an experimental
setup that would allow one to assess both the state of
consciousness, and, independently, the state of the wave
function. To this end, we consider an adapted version
(Kim et al., 2000) of the experimental setup originally
proposed by Scully and Dru¨hl (1982) and designed to
acquire “which-path” information in a so-called double-
slit experiment without interference (see Figure 1).
First, one photon from the pump travels through the
double-slit and can hit either region A or B located on
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the nonlinear optical crystal to produce an entangled
pair of photons. In the resulting pair, one photon (the
signal) travels through the lens LS and is detected by
the detector, D0, positioned at the focal plane of LS. The
other photon (the idler) is routed the other direction and
travels through a prism to be diverted––depending on the
region in which it has been produced (A or B)––either
towards D1 or D2. Thus, by knowing which of the two
detectors has registered a photon, we know which path
the signal photon has taken.
Next, we analyze the system more closely. Assume
first that the laser emits only one photon at a time. The
state of the photon, Ψ , can be described as:
Ψ =
1√
2
(|L〉 + |R〉), (3)
where |L〉 and |R〉 indicate the photon’s states, i.e.,
whether photon passed through the left or right slit, re-
spectively. As a result, after the generation of a pho-
ton pair in the optical crystal, the signal photon may
take either both paths 1 and 2 simultaneously (if it is
in a superposition state, |1, 1′〉 + |2, 2′〉 , and hence the
wave function did not collapse) or through only one of
the two (if it is in single state, |1, 1′〉 or |2, 2′〉 due to a
collapse of the wave function). If the photons are al-
ways in a superposition state, after sufficient number of
photons have been registered at D0, the distribution of
the registering location along the x-direction will exhibit
standard Young’s double-slit interference pattern, mani-
fested by the distribution consisting of a series of peaks
and troughs (Kim et al., 2000). In contrast, the photons
that assume a single state will not produce such an inter-
ference pattern but will instead form a single-peak dis-
tribution (Kim et al., 2000). Thus, the presence of the
interference pattern at D0 indicates whether the wave
function of signal photon collapsed or not 1. Thus, re-
garding the collapse discussed here, the relevant infor-
mation (corresponding results of measurement) is which
path the photons took. Now, we can derive the predic-
tions for this experimental setup that follow form previ-
ously formulated Proposition:
The interference pattern should be visible if “which-
path” information has not been registered in conscious-
ness of the observer (e.g., the experimenter).
If the above is true, we expected to find the interfer-
ence pattern at D0 in the following conditions:
1Interference pattern is not necessarily obvious from the entire dis-
tribution. So proper separation of sub-populations of registered pho-
tons may be needed (Kim et al., 2000).
1) No actual attempt to measure the “which-path” in-
formation was made, that is, D1 and D2 are not imple-
mented at all.
2) The “which-path” information was measured as D1
and D2 are implemented in order to interact with the
incoming photons. However, no results were recorded
by any macroscopic device and are not visible or in any
way accessible to a human observer.
3) The “which-path” information was measured by
a macroscopic device such as D1 and D2. The results
were not recorded but were instead presented to a hu-
man observer directly such that the relevant informa-
tion entered the sensory system but, at the same time,
the observer was distracted in order to prevent con-
scious detection of this event. In other words, the in-
formation necessary to achieve phenomenal represen-
tation was available in the nervous system, but con-
scious phenomenal experience was actually not real-
ized. Thus, there were only non-phenomenal mental
representations. The relevant information can be pre-
sented by using a memory-less device (e.g., an old fash-
ion gauge-based instrument) or by feeding the idle pho-
tons (or after amplification) directly into the retina and,
thus, having human eyes serve directly the function of
D1 and D2 (see Brunner et al., 2008; Thaheld, 2008,
2009). A distraction that prevents one from consciously
detecting a stimulus is made routinely in psychologi-
cal studies and can be achieved by various means, such
as the visual masking (Lachter et al., 2000), attentional
blink (Raymond et al., 1992), binocular rivalry (Koch
and Hepp, 2006), change blindness (Rensink et al.,
1997), execution of a concurrent tasks (Kahneman et al.,
1967) , or by simply cluttering the visual scene (Treis-
man and Gelade, 1980). The interference with con-
scious perception can be made even more directly by
using trans-cranial magnetic stimulation. One could ap-
ply a magnetic pulse above e.g., visual cortex, in order
to interrupt the information processing in this brain re-
gion, preventing hence conscious perception of the vi-
sual stimuli (Silvanto et al., 2005).
Moreover, one can manipulate gradually the level of
subjective certainty of the presence of this information.
This should then, according to the proposition, affect
the contrast of the interference pattern accordingly––as
it has been shown in physical experiments by manipu-
lating the extent to which the “which-path” information
was available, e.g., by changing the position of photon
detector (Zeilinger, 1999a) or by attenuating the optical
transmission (Mandel, 1999).
Verifying these three predictions through empirical
tests we propose to be a necessary requirement to war-
rant the hypothesis that consciousness of the outcome
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of a measurement is necessary for the wave function to
collapse. By formulating these predictions and require-
ment, we make this hypothesis empirically testable and
hence, falsifiable.
3. Existing evidence
The experimental results necessary to falsify the pre-
dictions 1 and 2 already exist. First, as described by
Mandel (1999) and Zeilinger (1999a), in experiments
similar to that proposed here, if “which-path” informa-
tion was in principle obtainable, then even though no
actual attempt was made to extract this information (i.e.,
to measure it), no interference pattern was found. Thus,
the first prediction of consciousness hypothesis is false.
In other set of experiments (Eichmann et al., 1993; Du¨rr
et al., 1998), “which-path” information was measured
but was not recorded by any macroscopic device (for
example, this information was stored only in the state
of single atom or photon) and, therefore, was not ac-
cessible to a conscious observer. Under such condition,
also no interference pattern was found. Therefore, the
existing evidence indicates that the second prediction is
also false.
To the best of our knowledge, no direct attempt was
made to test the third prediction. However, the expecta-
tions for this experiment are clearly set by the evidence
related to predictions 1 and 2. That is, if no interference
pattern was obtained when the “which-path” informa-
tion was not fed into the eye of the observer (e.g., car-
ried by the idler photon as illustrated in Fig.1), the same
is expected to occur if the photon reached the observer’s
retina but the person was distracted as not to be able to
detect the event.
4. Discussion
We first derived a proposition about the relationship
between the collapse of the wave function and conscious
perception. Our subsequent analysis lead to the con-
clusion that this proposition is already disproved by the
existing empirical results, which forces us to conclude
tentatively the following: Conscious access to the in-
formation about the outcome of a measurement of a
quantum state is not necessary for the collapse of wave
function––conclusion similar to those suggested else-
where (Mandel, 1999; Zeilinger, 1999a; Brukner and
Zeilinger, 2002).
Does the present analysis really tell us something
about the relation between consciousness and quantum
mechanics? One may argue that with the current exper-
imental set up (shown in Figure 1), quantum mechanics
as we known can predict, correctly, no interference pat-
tern in D0, irrespective of what happen with the idler
photons (except for “erasing” the “which-path” infor-
mation that is carried by those photons, see Kim et al.,
2000), and certainly irrespective of whether a conscious
observer is involved and where the attention of this ob-
server is directed. Therefore, this setup cannot tell us
anything new about the relation between consciousness
and quantum mechanics that we did not know before.
So, did we just provide a circular argument?
To answer this question, let us consider the type of ex-
periments that can be proposed in principle. According
to the opinion mentioned above, a really interesting test
would involve some observables not determined by the
current quantum theory. Only in that case, conscious-
ness of the observer would be given a chance to affect
the results and only in that case we would be searching
empirically for novel discoveries. But, given the known
properties of quantum mechanics, is it possible ever to
conceptualize such an experiment? Designing such an
experiment would mean finding a situation in which the
quantum mechanics is either incomplete (e.g., the cur-
rent theory does not predict whether interference will be
observed) or inconsistent (e.g., theoretically, presence
or absence of interference are both possible).
In the early years of quantum mechanics (see for ex-
ample Einstein et al., 1935) doubts have been raised
about the correctness of this theory––which was a nat-
ural component of the scientific process. But by now,
more than seven decades later, quantum theory has been
proven to be one of the most accurate theories in the
whole science. Not a single prediction of quantum
mechanics has been empirically disproved. This casts
doubts on the possibility of designing a novel exper-
iment in which an observable is not completely con-
strained by the known theory and would be still open to
the influences from the side of the consciousness of the
observer. Such an attempt would be equivalent to pos-
ing a challenge to the firmly established formulations
of quantum theory. The odds of something like this to
succeed seem too small to warrant pursuing. There-
fore, we argue that the kind of experiment proposed
and discussed in the present paper, for which the results
are completely predictable by the known properties of
quantum mechanics, is the only kind of experiment that
can be in principle proposed. The results we described
can be considered as mere derivation of the quantum
theory. The reason it is important for us here is that it
manifests a perspective important for the current discus-
sion––quantum mechanics may have not left any space
for the observer’s consciousness to manipulate the ex-
perimental results.
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This conclusion suggests constraints for understand-
ing the measurement problem and the mental-physical
relationship. Firstly, it is necessary to discuss what
constitutes a measurement, if we use the collapse of
wave function as a defining characteristic of it. Clearly,
measurement can be carried out without a macroscopic
measuring device. For example, the idler photon, that
carries the “which-path” information, can serve as the
measuring device. In similar experiments, atoms with
intrinsic states carrying “which-path” information can
also work as measuring devices and hence can cause
the interference pattern to disappear (Scully and Dru¨hl,
1982). Therefore, the suggestion that the measurement
is completed when the results are registered in con-
sciousness or when the results are recorded macroscop-
ically (for example, see Primas and Esfeld, 1997) does
not seem to hold. It appears that neither the conscious
registration nor the macroscopic recording is necessary
for the collapse of the wave function. Even the interac-
tion with the environment, as suggested by decoherence
theory, is not a sufficient ingredient for measurement
and collapsing the wave function. Because as long as
the “which-path” is in principle unobtainable, the wave
function does not collapse, regardless of the interaction
of the system with the environment (e.g., see Kim et al.,
2000 and other “quantum eraser” experiments). One
alternative is to conceptualize the quantum mechanics
as being based on a structure of information (Zeilinger,
1999b; Brukner and Zeilinger, 2002, 2005).
Secondly, our argument about the existence of col-
lapse without conscious registration of corresponding
results casts strong doubt on those interpretations of
quantum mechanics that place the observer’s mind in a
special position (e.g., many-minds interpretation, Lock-
wood, 1996). In such interpretations, the wave function
is assumed to be the only and complete description of
physical reality. There is no objective “collapse” occur-
ring outside the mind of the observer. Hence, accord-
ing to these interpretations, the effect of a measurement
is “to create an entanglement between the state of the
system being measured, the measuring apparatus, and
the mind of the observer” (Lockwood, 1996). Hence,
the single state revealed after the measurement is only
perceived by the mind and does not reflect any physi-
cal event outside this particular mind. However, as we
argued, empirical evidence suggests that collapse oc-
curs without the involvement of the mind. This renders
the no-collapse-outside-the-mind interpretations unten-
able. Importantly, the implicit assumption in these in-
terpretations that the mind has a special property and
can, through collapse, perceive a single state has led to
a symmetrical completion of the relations by propos-
ing that the collapse of the wave function––within the
brain––is responsible for the emergence of conscious-
ness (e.g., see Mensky, 2007). The present analysis
provides strong reasons for refuting the underlying ar-
guments: If the former need to be rejected by empirical
evidence, the latter loses its foundations.
Thirdly, if consciousness does not play a special role
in the measuring procedure, the role of the observer in
quantum mechanics would be much less unique or mys-
terious. The observer would play a role no more spe-
cial than that in the classical theory, for example, in
Einstein’s special theory of relativity (Shimony, 1963)
or in Darwin’s theory of evolution. Some authors sug-
gested that, if consciousness is irrelevant, the role of
observer is special in the sense that he/she can choose
the quantum reality that will be created. For example,
the experimenter may decide whether to realize the in-
terference pattern or not by deciding whether to make
the “which-path” information available or not (Brukner
and Zeilinger, 2002, 2005). However, to make such
choices special in comparison to other choices made
by a mechanically deterministic systems (e.g., a robot)
or random number generators (e.g., by playing a quan-
tum dice), one needs to assume that the human observer
makes decisions in a qualitatively different way, perhaps
through “free will”. Neither theoretical analyses nor
the empirical data support the idea that humans make
decisions free of the physical processes or of the in-
fluences from the environment (Wegner, 2003; Baum,
2004; Haggard, 2005, 2008). Therefore, we do not see
how the fact that the experimenter has a choice could en-
dow him or her with any more special role in the quan-
tum than in the classical theory. Moreover, the conclu-
sion that the observer plays no more a special role in
the quantum than in the classical mechanics would hold
even if we assumed the existence of “free will”. This is
simply because we would then “create” physical reality
routinely, outside the physics experiments, though each
individual’s actions resulting from our daily interactions
with the (mostly non-quantum) world. Therefore, “free
will” cannot save the consciousness hypothesis for the
explanation of the measurement problem, nor can it put
the human observer at a more special place in quantum
theory than it has been assigned in the classical theory.
Finally, it is helpful to note that the current analysis is
aimed to clarify a specific relationship between the mind
and the physical world, namely the hypothetical neces-
sity of conscious registration of a measurement result to
collapse the wave function. We do not try to draw any
general conclusions about the relation between physi-
cal reality and phenomenal representations. One may
argue that, even if we show that the conscious regis-
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tration of “which-path” information is not necessary to
collapse the wave function, we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that the consciousness remains nevertheless re-
sponsible for the happening of the physical events. For
instance, one possibility is that the single-peaked distri-
bution at D0 would never occur without a conscious per-
ception of this distribution. To address this question, it
is helpful to clarify the present assumption about phys-
ical reality. We used the criteria suggested by Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen (1935), stating that if one can pre-
dict the physical quantity with certainty and without dis-
turbing the system, one can consider this quantity as a
physical reality. In our case, we can consider the dis-
tribution at D0 as the physical quantity of interest and
we demonstrated that if the “which-path” information is
obtainable, the distribution is always single-peaked (i.e.,
without interference patterns). That is, in this particular
case, we can predict the physical quantity with certainty
and without disturbing it. Therefore, we consider the
distribution in D0 as physically real. With this clari-
fied, we can infer that the question about the possibility
that conscious perception of D0 distribution causes the
collapse of all the wave functions simultaneously and
creates hence the distribution itself, is an equivalent of
asking whether the conscious perception creates the re-
ality of the world in general. According to this latter
idea, the universe would not exist if all its conscious
creatures close their eyes and shut their ears. This is a
non-trivial question––known as solipsism––that has chal-
lenged human intellect for a long time. It is important
to point out that this assertion is beyond the scope of
scientific enquiry as it is not empirically testable. In
other words, there is no conceivable experimental setup
by which this statement could be falsified. Solely for
that reason this assertion does not constitute a scientific
statement (Popper, 1963).
In conclusion, the available evidence does not indi-
cate that the observer’s explicit phenomenal representa-
tion about the outcome of a measurement plays a role
in collapsing the wave function. We also suggest that
the observer does not serve a more fundamental func-
tion in quantum mechanics than that in the classical the-
ory. Thus, the idea that by mere observation the exper-
imenter creates physical reality is not viable. This sup-
ports Wigner’s opinion in his later years and promises to
fulfill his hopes––that we “will not embrace solipsism”
and “will let us admit that the world really exists” (cited
from Primas and Esfeld, 1997). Perhaps equally impor-
tantly, we can add our own hope that the rejection of the
role of consciousness in quantum mechanics will also
lead us to re-evaluate the proposals that quantum me-
chanics is vital for explaining the consciousness. Hav-
ing these two deep mysteries disentangled one from the
other might be an important step forward towards un-
derstanding better either of them.
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